The commander of the Defense Contract Management Agency’s Unmanned Systems-Experimental Command is urging defense officials to judge small-drone purchases by the combat value they can deliver before becoming obsolete, rather than by unit price alone. In an op-ed published by Breaking Defense, Col. Dustin Thomas argues that rapidly changing threats and countermeasures could turn large inventories of inexpensive drones into costly liabilities.
Thomas illustrates the risk with a hypothetical Pentagon purchase of 100,000 drones at $1,000 each. If an adversary develops a countermeasure after 30,000 drones are used, the remaining 70,000 could become operationally ineffective even if they remain functional. The military would then face a choice between discarding the hardware and paying to upgrade it, raising the effective cost of each drone that still provides useful combat value.
That calculation challenges an acquisition habit formed during the Industrial Age, Thomas writes. Standardization, specialization, synchronization and certification made it possible to produce large numbers of repeatable systems at falling unit costs. For conventional equipment such as tanks, trucks, bombs and aircraft, a lower price could serve as a rough proxy for buying more combat power.
Small drones now face a different production and operating environment, according to Thomas. Artificial intelligence-assisted tools can generate aircraft designs quickly, while 3D printers, robotic arms and computer numerical control machines can produce different shapes without being dedicated to one design. Modeling, simulation and digital engineering can connect rapid design changes to manufacturing and verification. Together, those tools could compress the cycle from design to fielding from years to days or weeks, the op-ed says.
That speed benefits both sides. Thomas points to Ukraine as evidence that technologies enabling faster adaptation can also help adversaries modify their systems and tactics more quickly. As countermeasures evolve, the useful life of a fixed drone design can shrink. Operational obsolescence, in this framework, results from changes in the threat, technology or tactics that reduce a system’s ability to perform its intended mission.
The cost extends beyond unused airframes. Thomas says an obsolete inventory can also consume logistics resources, storage space, manufacturing capacity and lost opportunities. He proposes that acquisition leaders assess how much useful combat value a production lot is likely to provide before its design requires revision, while industry incentives should reward systems that permit rapid technology insertion and integration.
The approach does not reject scale. Mass production would remain important for components whose value comes from repeatability, including microelectronics and advanced sensors. The proposed shift is toward preserving flexibility in structures and interfaces, then combining standardized components with manufacturing processes that can adapt to new battlefield demands.
Game of Drones, an event founded by Thomas, is presented in the op-ed as an example of this model, involving cooperation among airframe makers, payload manufacturers and algorithm developers. The passage describes participants working to solve current operational problems, including a demonstration that paired a sensor company with an aircraft design firm to create a navigation tool for a GPS-denied environment.
Thomas also points to the 2026 Rim of the Pacific exercise, where the Navy has promoted an advanced-manufacturing demonstration involving rapid, in-theater drone production. He argues that exercises such as RIMPAC should test a complete operational sequence: identify a battlefield problem, integrate new technology, redesign a weapon system, manufacture it and deliver it to combat.
The resulting acquisition priority would be to stockpile components and flexible production capacity rather than treating finished drones like traditional munitions. Drones may still be needed in large numbers, but Thomas argues that inventories should be organized around the ability to build, modify and field systems quickly as threats change. The next step for planners, in his proposal, is to make manufacturing and adaptation part of the operational concept instead of treating production as a one-time purchase.