The US Navy has publicly declared only three Taiwan Strait transits since the start of President Donald Trump’s second administration, according to an analysis by researchers at the Heritage Foundation. One of those passages occurred in early 2026, when two US naval vessels entered the strait weeks after Chinese military exercises around Taiwan featured a mock air and naval blockade. The Heritage analysis says the pace would produce only 14 publicly reported transits across the full second Trump term if it continues, a substantial decline from previous administrations (Breaking Defense).

The analysis counted 28 naval transits during Trump’s first administration and 32 during President Joe Biden’s administration. Its projection for Trump’s second term represents a 50 percent drop from the first Trump administration and a 56 percent decline from the Biden years. The figures cover publicly reported passages and draw on government statements, news reports, US Navy press reporting and existing databases, including the Taiwan Security Monitor, the researchers wrote.

The timing makes the reduction more consequential, the analysis argues. Chinese military activity around Taiwan has intensified rather than receded. The December 2025 exercises included what the analysis described as Beijing’s first mock comprehensive air and naval blockade of the island. The US Department of Defense’s 2025 China Military Report assessed that China’s daily activity around Taiwan, near-weekly joint combat patrols and responses during periods of political tension had all reached successive yearly highs.

Chinese forces have also become a routine presence around Taiwan since 2022, after then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited the island, the analysis says. It describes incursions into Taiwanese airspace and surrounding waters as near-daily and says roughly five or six Chinese warships are present around Taiwan on a typical day. The report also links the severing of undersea cables and stops and inspections of Taiwanese vessels to a broader pattern of maritime coercion.

China has declared the Taiwan Strait to be its territorial waters, but virtually no other country, including the United States, recognizes that claim as lawful or legitimate, according to the analysis. Naval passages are intended to challenge the claim in practice by sailing through zones Beijing has unilaterally declared. Their visibility also gives them a signaling role beyond the immediate movement of ships. Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry called a joint US-Canadian transit in October 2024 “concrete actions to safeguard Taiwan Strait peace” and noted that it was the fourth such joint passage in less than two years.

The passages also provide the US Navy with operating experience in one of the world’s most contested waterways. A prolonged reduction could therefore affect both signaling and familiarity with the strait, the Heritage researchers argue. They warn that allies and partners, as well as Beijing, could interpret a decline in public transits as evidence that Washington is retreating from its commitments, even if US forces remain active elsewhere.

The public count may not capture every US naval passage. Some observers have suggested that the Navy is conducting “silent transits” that the Pentagon does not announce in order to reduce tensions with Beijing. A September 2025 passage by the USS Higgins and HMS Richmond was not publicly advertised but was later confirmed by a Pentagon official, without a Navy press release. Such operations would preserve some naval activity while reducing the public signal attached to it.

Former Pentagon official Drew Thompson has argued that Taiwan Strait transits are only one part of the broader US military presence and should be judged qualitatively rather than by number alone. The Heritage analysis acknowledges that point but maintains that routine, publicly announced passages have an outsized role because they visibly contest China’s maritime claim and demonstrate navigational rights. Its researchers recommend restoring the public tempo established during the previous two administrations as Chinese maritime coercion continues to increase.