The U.S. Navy has publicly declared only one Taiwan Strait transit in 2026, marking a sharp reduction in the pace recorded during the first Trump administration and the Biden administration. The passage, conducted by two naval vessels weeks after China held high-intensity exercises around Taiwan in December 2025, was the first publicly declared U.S. naval transit of the year, Breaking Defense reported.

The decline is also visible across the second Trump administration. Only three publicly declared U.S. transits have taken place since its start, according to an analysis described by Breaking Defense. At the current rate, the analysis projects 14 publicly reported transits during the full second Trump term.

That projected total would represent a 50 percent decrease from the 28 transits recorded during the first Trump administration and a 56 percent decrease from the 32 recorded during the Biden administration. The analysis compiled information from official U.S. and foreign government statements, news reports, U.S. naval press reports and existing databases, including the Taiwan Security Monitor.

The timing places the lower public tempo against a more active Chinese military presence around Taiwan. China’s December 2025 exercises included, for the first time, a mock comprehensive air and naval blockade of the island. The U.S. Department of Defense’s 2025 China Military Report assessed that China’s daily activity around Taiwan, near-weekly joint combat patrols and responses during periods of heightened political tension had each reached successive yearly highs.

U.S. and other foreign governments do not recognize Beijing’s claim that the Taiwan Strait is Chinese territorial water as lawful or legitimate, according to the analysis. Naval passages have therefore served two purposes: operating through waters subject to China’s unilaterally declared claims and publicly demonstrating that the United States continues to reject those claims.

The passages also provide a visible signal to Taiwan and other regional governments while giving the Navy practical experience operating in the strait. The analysis argues that a prolonged decline could reduce that experience and create uncertainty about Washington’s willingness to contest coercive or destabilizing activity. It also links the concern to China’s broader pressure campaign, including near-daily air and maritime activity around Taiwan, the severing of undersea cables and stops and inspections of Taiwanese vessels.

The importance of counting transits is disputed. Former Pentagon official Drew Thompson said the passages are only one part of the broader U.S. military presence and should be evaluated by quality rather than quantity. But the analysis maintains that public transits have unusual signaling value because they are visible, routine and directly tied to navigational rights. Taiwan’s foreign ministry made a similar point after a joint U.S.-Canadian passage in October 2024, calling it concrete action to safeguard peace in the strait and noting that it was the fourth joint transit in less than two years.

One possible explanation for the lower public count is that the Navy has conducted “silent transits” that the Pentagon did not publicize. A September 2025 passage by the USS Higgins and HMS Richmond was not advertised in a Navy press release but was later confirmed by a Pentagon official. Such operations would preserve some activity while reducing the public signal, although the analysis says undeclared passages cannot fully replace publicly announced operations in shaping perceptions among allies, partners and Beijing.

The Heritage Foundation researchers cited in the article argue that the Pentagon should restore the routine of publicly announced transits used during the previous two administrations. The immediate measure of change remains the public count: one declared U.S. Navy transit in 2026 so far, against a projected full-term pace well below recent administrations, while Chinese military activity around Taiwan continues to intensify.