The U.S. Navy has publicly declared only one Taiwan Strait transit in 2026, marking a sharp reduction in publicly reported operations during President Donald Trump’s second administration. The passage, conducted by two U.S. naval vessels weeks after China staged high-intensity exercises around Taiwan, was the first publicly declared U.S. naval transit of the year and only the third since the administration began, Breaking Defense reported, citing a Heritage Foundation analysis.

The analysis counted 28 naval transits during Trump’s first administration and 32 during President Joe Biden’s administration. At the current rate, it projects 14 publicly reported U.S. transits over the full second Trump administration. That would represent a 50 percent decline from the first Trump administration and a 56 percent decline from the Biden administration.

The figures measure publicly reported passages, not necessarily every U.S. naval movement through the strait. Some observers have suggested the Navy may be conducting “silent transits” that the Pentagon does not announce, in part to avoid provoking Beijing. A September 2025 passage by the USS Higgins and Britain’s HMS Richmond was not publicly advertised but was later confirmed by a Pentagon official, with no Navy press release, the article said.

That distinction matters because a transit serves both an operational and a political purpose. China claims the Taiwan Strait as its territorial waters, while the United States and virtually all other countries do not recognize that claim as lawful or legitimate. Sailing through the waterway challenges the practical acceptance of Beijing’s unilateral assertion and demonstrates that the United States continues to exercise navigational rights there.

Publicly declared operations also send a broader signal to allies and the international community. After a joint U.S.-Canadian transit in October 2024, Taiwan’s foreign ministry called the operation “concrete actions to safeguard Taiwan Strait peace” and noted that it was the fourth joint transit by the two countries in less than two years, according to the analysis. A prolonged reduction in visible passages could therefore affect perceptions of U.S. priorities and credibility in the region.

The decline in announced transits comes as Chinese military activity around Taiwan has become more persistent. The article said Chinese aircraft and warships have operated around the island on a near-daily basis since 2022, when then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan. It also cited the Defense Department’s 2025 China Military Report, which assessed that China’s daily activity around Taiwan, near-weekly joint combat patrols and response exercises conducted during periods of heightened political tensions had each reached successive yearly highs.

Chinese exercises in December 2025 included, for the first time, a mock comprehensive air and naval blockade of Taiwan. The article also described the severing of undersea cables and stops and inspections of Taiwanese vessels as elements of Beijing’s coercive “salami-slicing” tactics. Against that backdrop, routine U.S. naval presence could complicate China’s effort to achieve what Chinese President Xi Jinping has described as a “strategic decisive victory.”

The transits also give the U.S. Navy practical experience operating in the strait. The Heritage authors argue that a prolonged decline could reduce that experience and allow Beijing to interpret the change as weakening U.S. commitment. Former Pentagon official Drew Thompson offered a narrower assessment, saying Taiwan Strait transits “are just one aspect of U.S. military presence” and should be judged qualitatively rather than by count alone. The analysis acknowledged that point but argued that the visibility and regularity of public passages give them an important role in signaling U.S. policy.

The Heritage authors call for the Pentagon to restore the routine tempo of publicly announced transits used during the previous two administrations. Undeclared passages may partly offset the decline in public operations, but the reduced number of visible transits risks creating uncertainty about Washington’s priorities among allies, partners and China.