The recent flurries of requirements activity around ground robotics at brigade echelon are not a surprise to anyone who has watched the Army try to square its doctrinal ambitions with the current state of autonomy and logistics. Over the last two years the service has accelerated experimentation, notably folding robotic mules and prototype combat chassis into exercises intended to test human machine teaming at scale.
If an RFI aimed at brigade support ground drones landed on an acquisition inbox in early May 2024, its practical purpose would be straightforward. The Army uses RFIs to translate operational curiosity into technical parameters and to probe industrial capacity. For robotics the critical lines of inquiry are predictable: what payload and range can off-the-shelf or near-commercial systems carry; what autonomy modes are mature enough for tactical use; how will command and control integrate with brigade networks; and what sustainment tail will these platforms impose on units in the field. These are not hypothetical curiosities. The service has been fielding and testing logistics and scout UGV concepts, and has established acquisition tracks for unmanned chassis and enabling autonomy software.
Three technical realities will shape responses from industry and the Army’s own evaluation of any brigade support RFI. First, payload versus mobility is a hard trade. Systems designed as “robotic mules” have already demonstrated useful logistics lift for squads and sections, but scaling that capability to brigade tempo demands bigger chassis, greater energy density, or creative concepts of operations that accept distributed logistics over time. Past SMET efforts show the utility of purpose‑built logistics UGVs, but they also show how specialization drives vehicle form factors and sustainment demands.
Second, autonomy is best treated as a graded capability rather than a magic switch. The Army’s experiments emphasize combined modes: direct teleoperation for complex tasks, waypoint navigation for logistics runs, and leader follower or sentry modes for integrated operations. The RFI process typically asks industry to delineate where on that spectrum their product sits and what it needs from communications and sensing to be mission usable. The plausibility of beyond‑line‑of‑sight autonomy at brigade depth depends as much on resilient, low‑latency networking and cybersecurity as it does on perception software.
Third, human factors and concept of employment matter as much as raw performance metrics. Brigade commanders will not accept a platform that adds cognitive load or creates brittle dependencies on a fragile data link. Any RFI that seeks brigade support UGVs should therefore press vendors for human machine interface design, failure modes, and ease of maintenance at company and brigade support sections. Army experimentation has repeatedly shown that soldier acceptance is earned through systems that simplify rather than complicate the tactical picture.
Beyond technical criteria, an honest appraisal must address doctrine, law, and ethics. Ground robots at brigade level will be used for resupply, casualty evacuation, reconnaissance, and possibly force protection. Each employment brings a distinct set of rules of engagement and accountability questions. An RFI can and should force vendors to document how their autonomy enforces operational constraints, how human oversight is preserved, and how logs and black boxes will preserve chain‑of‑evidence for post‑mission review. This is not optional philosophizing; it is an operational necessity if the service intends to put these machines where shooting or life‑saving decisions might occur.
Cost and industrial base realities will then settle many debates. The Army has demonstrated a preference for iterative fielding of minimum viable capabilities rather than waiting for perfect systems. The RCV prototyping competitions and the SMET work show a recurrent pattern: build prototypes, learn with soldiers, refine requirements. If an RFI asks for brigade support ground drones it will also be testing price points, producibility, and how many vendors can meet surge demands under realistic budgetary constraints.
Finally, the promise and peril of brigade ground drones are both social as well as technical. Automation can reduce soldier risk and physical burden, but it can also shift where risk is borne and who is accountable for fast decisions. Any serious RFI should be read as a policy prompt as much as a technical solicitation. The Army needs answers that preserve commander autonomy, soldier agency, and legal clarity while delivering measurable operational utility. If industry provides rigorous, transparent proposals that acknowledge limits as well as capabilities, the result will be useful. If instead vendors return marketing prose that promises fully autonomous miracles, the field experimentation that follows will be longer, costlier, and more ethically fraught than necessary.
The measure of success for a brigade support ground drone effort will not be a single headline capability. It will be the degree to which the platform reduces cognitive and physical burden on soldiers, integrates into the brigade’s command and sustainment webs, and preserves human judgment at the decisive moments. An RFI is the right instrument to begin that conversation, provided that both sides use it to surface tradeoffs candidly and to commit to soldier‑centric, iterative experimentation rather than a one‑shot procurement romance with technology.